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THE EFFECTS OF INTERIM MEASURES OF
PROTECTION IN THE INTERNATIONAL
COURT OF JUSTICE
C. H. CROCKETT*
Article 41 of the Statute of the International Court of Justice
provides that the Court has the power to indicate interim measures' of
protection to preserve the respective rights of the party-states pending
final judgment on the merits. 2 Through a series of holdings from the
predecessor Permanent Court of International Justice, which was given
substantially the same power, and from holdings of the present Court
and through the formulation of Court rules 3 applied to interim measures, many problematic matters relating to the Court's powers under
article 41 have been settled. Examples of such matters include the
purpose of interim relief and jurisdictional prerequisites.
There remains, however, the unanswered question of whether
there is a legal duty of compliance with a court order imposed under
article 41. To one familiar with the similar preliminary injunction
pendente lite of the Anglo-American legal system and unfamiliar with
the procedure and practice of international arbitral and judicial tribunals, it might be surprising that such a doubt exists. It would be
expected, after a period of forty-three years (accounting for the lives of
both Courts), that the question would have been resolved, or that in the
absence of judicial or legislative resolution, a consensus of opinion
would exist with regard to such a seemingly fundamental matter.
Obvious analogies between interim measures and preliminary injunctions would call for an opinion that the former, like the latter, are
binding upon the parties. Yet, such a conclusion is probably unwarranted in that one reason the term "provisional measures" was chosen
by the framers of the Statute of the Permanent Court, could well have
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1. On the subject of interim measures generally, see Goldsworthy, Interim Measures of Protection in the International Court of Justice, 68 AM. J. INT'L L. 258 (1974)
[hereinafter cited as Goldsworthy].
2. Article 41 is contained in chapter III (Procedure) of the Statute of the International Court of Justice. See text accompanying note 28.
3. The text of the recently amended (May 10, 1972) Rules of Court may be found
at 67 AM. J. INT'L L. L. 195 (1973).
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been specifically to avoid the suggestion of a dominancy of AngloAmerican legal institutions at the expense of other systems within
which the injunction was unknown. 4 The similarities and the differences existing between the various aspects of interim measures and
preliminary injunctions afford a basis for illustrating and, hopefully,
dissolving certain misconceptions which surround the nature of interim
relief in the International Court.
During the past four years, the Court has been occupied to a
considerable degree with requests for the indication of interim measures. In both of the recent Fisheries Jurisdiction Cases,5 which involved the United Kingdom and West Germany as applicants disputing
Iceland's extension of its exclusive fishery zone, the Court ordered
specific measures to obtain as to fish catch limitations, and prohibitions against interference with British and German fishing vessels in
the disputed zone. The cases presented an ideal opportunity for a
decision on whether there was a duty of compliance with the measures.
The Court first found it had jurisdiction6 because it was clear that
Iceland had not conformed to the measures; the Court then held in its
judgment on the merits7 that the Icelandic extension was not opposable
to the applicants. West Germany did maintain in its submissions, that
Iceland was under an obligation to make compensation for illegal
interference pendente lite with its fishing vessels. However, the Court
found that this submission was too abstract for adjudication, 8 even
though it could have been based on the interim protection order.
Prior to these cases, the Court had no Qpportunity to speak
directly to the question of the binding effect of interim measures. The
Permanent Court of International Justice indicated measures in two
cases. In the first, 9 the Court subsequently revoked its order at the
4. See E. DUMBAULD, INTERIM MEASURES OF PROTECTION IN INTERNATIONAL
CONTROVERSIES 144 (1932) [hereinafter cited as DUMBAULD]. Article 41- was based upon
Roman law concepts. In the Phillimore report on article 12 of the League of Nations,
certain objections were noted to the inclusion of a power to issue "injunctions". Among
these was the assumed general unfamiliarity with the injunction and its lack of importance in other legal systems. It is probable that the report had an influence upon the
advisory committee of jurists which drafted the Statute of the Court.
5. United Kingdom v. Iceland, (Interim Protection), [1972] I.C.J. 12; Federal
Republic of Germany v. Iceland (Interim Protection), [1972] I.C.J. 30. The interim
protection orders in the two cases involved the same basic issues, and differed only as to
the maximum limits on'catches.
6. [1973] I.C.J. 3, 23; [1973] I.C.J. 49, 65.
7. United Kingdom v. Iceland, (Judgment), [19741 I.C.J. 3, 34; Federal Republic
of Germany v. Iceland, (Judgment), [1974] I.C.J. 175.
8. [1974] I.C.J. 175, 204-05.
9. Denunciation of the Treaty of 2nd November, 1865, between China and Belgium, [1927], P.C.I.J., ser. A, No. 8, at 6.
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request of the Applicant.' 0 In the other," the merits were never
reached because of the advent of the Second World War, which
marked the virtual demise of the Permanent Court. In three other
cases, requests for relief were refused. 12
Prior to the Fisheries JurisdictionCases, the International Court
of Justice had ordered interim measures in the case of the AngloIranian Oil Company,' 3 but subsequently held that jurisdiction on the
merits did not obtain. In the meantime, the United Kingdom, the
applicant in the case, attempted to secure enforcement of the measures
through the Security Council under article 94 of the Charter, ' 4 but such
efforts were unsuccessful.
That scenario has always been the focal point for commentary on
various aspects of interim measures, and particularly on the question of
whether there is a duty of compliance. However, such an approach has
failed to separate clearly the question of legal binding effect and
possible methods of enforcement of a Court order under article 41.
Apart from this confusion, the commentary on the binding nature of
interim measures has been sketchy and inconclusive. Three general
positions have been maintained: 1) that there is no obligation to
comply with interim measures; 1 2) that there is only a moral duty to
comply; 16 and 3) that there is a legal duty of compliance. 17 The reasons
supporting any one view, however, are frequently different. The
inconclusiveness of the writers probably stems partly from the fact that
the Court has never conclusively pronounced the legal effects of
interim measures.
In light of this, a great amount of speculation is perhaps unwarranted. Rather, what is intended here is an examination of the various
factors which have been considered relevant to the determination of
whether interim measures of protection are binding in law, as well as
10. Id. at 9.
11. The Electricity Company of Sophia and Bulgaria, [1939] P.C.I.J., ser. A/B, No.
79, at 194, 197.
12. Legal Status of the Southeastern Territory of Greenland, [1932] P.C.I.J., ser.
A/B, No. 48; Administration of the Prince von Pless, [1933] P.C.I.J., ser. A/B, No. 54;
Polish Agrarian Reform and the German Minority, [1933] P.C.I.J., ser. A/B, No. 58.
13. [1951] I.C.J. 89, 93.
14. See generally text at section VI.
15. See, e.g., B. CHENG, GENERAL PRINCIPLES OF LAW 273 (1953) [hereinafter cited
as CHENG]. The interim measure is merely a "judicial suggestion".
16. See, e.g., DUMBAULD, supra note 4, at 169.
17. See, e.g., the conclusion in Hambro, The Binding Characterof the Provisional
Measures of Protection Indicated by the International Court of Justice, in RECHTS
FRAGEN DER INTERNATIONAL ORGANIZATIONS, FESTSCHRIFT FUR HANS WEHBERG 152,
166 (1956) [hereinafter cited as Hambro]. The article presents an excellent exposition of
many of the matters considered herein.
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an exploration of other factors which should be considered. The
primary concern is to evaluate those factors and to point out other
considerations which arguably preclude a finding that interim measures impart a legal duty of compliance.
I.

PRELIMINARY CONSIDERATIONS

Under the Rules of the Court,I 8 a party to a dispute may request
that interim measures be indicated at any time during the proceedings,
although the request normally is made contemporaneously with the
filing of the application, or soon thereafter. Under the Rules, the
request is treated as a matter of urgency, having priority over all other
cases. Measures may also be ordered by the Court on its own motion.
If measures are indicated, they may be modified or revoked. Thus, an
indication of interim measures, unlike a judgment, is not res judicata. 19
This does not mean, of course, that while the order remains unrevoked
or unmodified, it could not alter the legal rights and duties of the
parties.

Although the Court has never characterized the effects of interim
measures, it may be concluded, somewhat negatively, that measures
are intended to have some effects. For example, in the Fisheries
Jurisdiction Case the Court noted that the measures would cease to
have effect at the time the final judgment was rendered. 20 This might
mean, however, that the indication merely imputed a moral obligation
21
of compliance.
18. Article 66 of the Revised Rules deals with interim measures. See note 3 supra.
19. Cf. Free Zones Case, [1929] P.C.I.J., ser. A, No. 22, at 5, 13; see Hambro,
supra note 16, at 163.
20. The Court further held that although the measures lapsed because the power of
the Court was exercisable only pendente lite, the parties were "not at liberty to conduct
their fishing activities in the disputed waters without limitation." [1974] I.C.J. 3, 202.
There is a strong inference that the measures, while operative, had the effect of so
limiting the amount of catches.
There was no mention in the companion United Kingdom case of the effect of the
rendition of the judgment on the earlier indicated measures; however, the United
Kingdom and Iceland had entered into a provisional arrangement regarding the catches
after the indication of the measures of protection relating to catches. For further
discussion on this point, see text accompanying notes 72-77 infra.
21. The expression "moral duty to comply" or "moral obligation", is used herein
in a very broad sense. If, because of the surrounding circumstances and acts of the
parties, it may be concluded reasonably that a party should comply with a court order,
such conclusion being based upon any considerations other than law, or those of a
political nature, then a moral duty to comply with such order may be said to exist. For
example, although the indication of interim measures might not alter the legal obligations
of a party, the fact that the International Court of Justice has issued the order, may
create ipso facto a moral duty.

https://scholarlycommons.law.cwsl.edu/cwilj/vol7/iss2/3

4

Crockett: The Effects of Interim Measures of Protection in the Internationa
CA[.IFORNIA

WESTERN

INTERNATIONAL LAW JOURNAL

Vol. 7

The purpose of interim measures is simply to preserve and protect
the respective rights of opposing parties, pending the final decision on
the merits. This purpose includes the prevention of an extension or
aggravation of the dispute. The "rights" which may be protected by
interim measures are those which the Court could adjudge as belonging
to one or the other of the parties.
The Court indicates measures only when the "circumstances" so
require. These circumstances obviously will be different from case to
case. Yet, the Court considers whether the circumstances are propitious; the circumstances must be of a legal character and subject to
legal criteria. 22 The Court will not consider as a "circumstance" a
legally irrelevant factor.
In order to exercise its power under article 41, the Court need
only be convinced of the possibility of its having jurisdiction over the
merits.23 One writer has concluded that this rule is justified because an
interim measure is nothing more than a "judicial suggestion". 24
25
The Permanent Court maintained that general principles of law
dictate that parties to a case before an international tribunal "must
abstain from any measure capable of exercising a prejudicial effect in
regard to the execution of the decision to be given and, in general, not
allow any step of any kind to be taken which might aggravate or extend
the dispute.' '26 Article 41 of the Statute applies this universal principle. It has been suggested that in light of this overriding principle,
interim measures are superfluous and do not involve a duty of compliance. 27 As will be demonstrated, certain logical difficulties arise if
this view of the effect of the general principle is accepted. This is
particularly the case with regard to those instances in which the Court
orders specific measures to obtain, rather than framing its order in the
form of a restatement of the general purposes of interim measures of
protection.
22. This principle is inferable from the Revocation of Interim Protection in the
Sino-Belgian case, [1927] P.C.I.J., ser. A, No. 8, at 9, 10.
23. This rule was first clearly laid down in Anglo-Iranian Oil Co., (Interim Protection), [19511 I.C.J. 89. There the Court decided that it had jurisdiction over the request
when it did not appear a priori that the Court lacked jurisdiction over the merits.
24.

CHENG, supra note 15.

25. See Goldsworthy, supra note 1, at 260-61. The duty of maintaining the status
quo may well be a rule imposed by customary international law, as well as, or rather than
a general principle of law implied in article 38(I)(c) of the Statute of the Court.
26. Electricity Company of Sofia and Bulgaria, [1939] P.C.I.J., ser. A/B, No. 79, at
199.
27.

See CHENG, supra note 15.
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II.

THE STATUTORY BASIS OF INTERIM MEASURES

Any comment on the question of the nature of interim measures
must include an examination of the terminology of article 41, which
probably is considered the most serious barrier to attributing full legal
effect to such measures. Article 41 reads as follows:
1. The Court shall have the power to indicate, if it considers that circumstances so require, any provisional measures which ought to be taken to preserve the respective
rights of either party.
2. Pending the final decision, notice of the measures suggested shall forthwith be given to the parties and to the
Security Council.28
The curious terms employed, "indicate" and "suggested", do
not ordinarily evince obligation. The terms "prescribe" and "order"
were considered in the deliberations of the advisory committee of
29
jurists who formulated the statute, but were rejected.
It has been observed that "indicate", although usually connoting
a mere form of suggestion, also may mean "to point out", with the
result that the Court's power is one to "point out" to the parties what
international law requires in order to conform to the general duty not to
aggravate the dispute pendente lite. 30 Such an interpretation still would
not answer the question of mandatory compliance, as there may still
exist only a moral obligation of compliance. Additionally, the wording
reveals that "indicate" is used synonymously with
of article 41(2)
"suggest". 3' Thus, if the words were intended to be used in their
ordinary signification, there is a strong inference that in no sense are
measures issued pursuant to article 41 meant to be binding.
28. In the Rules of the Court, the term "interim measures of protection" is utilized.
In the Statute of the Permanent Court of International Justice, the word "reserve"
instead of "preserve" was used; in article 41(2), the reference was to the "Council",
that is, the Council of the League of Nations. Otherwise, the provision has remained
unchanged. In many respects, the Courts may be treated as the same organization, for
the Statute has remained substantially unchanged. However, the Permanent Court did
not enjoy as high a status vis-a-vis the League of Nations as does the International Court
in relation to the United Nations of which it is the "principal judicial organ". See U.N.
CHARTER art. 92.
29. For an excellent discourse on the preparatory work of the statute, see DUMBAULD, supra note 4, at 144.
30. Goldsworthy, supra note 1, at 274.
31. But cf. the equally authoritative French text of article 41, which employs forms
of the verb "indiquer" in both paragraphs. The preparatory work tends to demonstrate
that it was the intention of the drafters to substitute "indicated" for "suggested" in
article 41(2). The failure to do so was apparently a mere oversight. See DUMBAULD,
supra note 4, at 145 n.3.
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However, an "ordinary meaning rule" cannot be presumed to
apply to the interpretation of the phraseology and terminology of
article 41. The terminology of international law and the practice of
international tribunals is rooted in diplomatic practice and diplomacy
* in general where a certain term may or may not be intended to mean
what it means in ordinary usage. In such a case, a term might well be
given an interpretation different from one which would likely flow
from a municipal judge or practitioner. In diplomacy, if a choice is
presented, the phrase or term carrying the least onerous connotation is
usually chosen so long as that choice accommodates the parties'
intentions. It has been observed often that the terminology of article 41
was based upon like provisions of the Bryan Treaties 32 and a similar
provision in the Statute of the Central American Court of Justice. 3 The
very reason that the Bryan provision was selected is probably because
of the diplomatic flavor of the language.
In addition, one must consider the circumstances which attended
the formulation of the Statute of the Court. Besides the practice of
arbitral tribunals which had developed in regard to interim relief, and
the powers afforded to the Central American Court, there were no
other precedents applicable to a truly international court. The considerations which motivated the committee of jurists to adopt a particular term or provision were different from those which play a part in
establishing an ad hoc or permanent arbitral tribunal, where the parties
and the problems before the tribunal are fewer in number and, in the
case of permanent arbitral tribunals, are of less magnitude in scope.
The Central American Court, although a court of law, could hardly be
considered a weighty precedent, because it dealt with a limited number
of problems of states in a distinctive region.
Thus, one must observe that generally there was a lack of helpful
and useful precedents to guide the drafters who must have been unclear
as to many matters that came before them for possible inclusion in the
Statute. Since the best way of resolving a certain question concerning
the Court's powers was unclear because of lack of precedent or
otherwise, it would have been unwise to obstruct the natural and
32. See, e.g., in the Treaty for the Advancement of Peace of October 13, 1914,
between Sweden and the United States, relating to dispute settlement. Article 4 reads in
part as follows:
In case the cause of the dispute should consist of certain acts already
committed or about to be committed, the Commission shall as soon as possible
indicate what measures to preserve the rights of each party ought in its opinion
to be taken provisionally and pending the delivery of its report.
38 Stat. 1874.
33. For the text of the Convention, see [1908] AM. J. INT'L L. Supp. 231 (1908).
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logical development of the Court's jurisprudence by the arbitrary grant
or denial of a power whose significance was not fully understood or at
least not fully agreed upon. It was obviously better that the Statute's
drafters allow the Court the necessary flexibility to resolve such matters as they arise, rather than denying a power that might have proved
essential to the successful functioning of the Court.
In light of this, the committee rejected a proposal3 4 that an express
compliance provision concerning interim measures be included in the
Rules. It is unclear whether the proposal was defeated on the basis that
the Statute, as worded, could not support such a provision, or for other
reasons perhaps of a more practical nature. It is noteworthy that an
apparent compromise was reached, as evidenced by the inclusion of a
provision in article 57 of the Rules which allowed the Court to place in
the record the fact that a party had failed to comply with interim
measures.3 5 On the other hand, there was never a provision to the
effect that the measures were not binding. Perhaps the absence of any
provision relating to compliance is best explained, as suggested above,
on the assumption that it was better to leave unstated those matters
upon which experts disagreed.
Another possible interpretation of the Statute suggests that the
absence of an express provision should not, apart from the preparatory
work, be taken too seriously because it is clear that a judgment is
binding. The Court could be said to have the inherent power to render
binding judgments, and express provision that judgments are binding
would not cause those judgments to become more binding. However,
there is no provision in the Statute which expresses this position.
There is some evidence that an arbitral tribunal would have an
inherent power to render binding interim measures of protection. A
fortiori, such a power would reside in an international court, absent a
limitation upon such power. Although the mentioned disagreements
within the advisory committee, as well as the inclusion of article 41,
militate against the inherency of such a power; a more current view
promoted by a member of the Court lends some cogency to this
position.3 6 If one assumes the Court to have at least the power to issue
34. This was the so-called Nyholm proposal. For a discussion of its history, see
note 4, at 146-47.
35. The original rule 57 provided that "[A]ny refusal by the parties to conform to
the suggestion of the Court . . . with regard to such measures, shall be placed on
record."
36. See the declaration of Judge Nagendra Singh in the Nuclear Tests Case,
Australia v. France (Interim Protection), [1973) I.C.J. 99, 109. See also Judge Sir Gerald
Fitzmaurice's separate opinion in the Northern CameroonsCase, [1%3] I.C.J. 97, 103.
DUMBAULD, supra
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interim protection orders absent article 41, then the approach to an
interpretation of article 41 will be a critical factor. In other words, a
restrictive interpretation could lead to the conclusion that article 41
was imposed as a limitation upon any inherent power the Court would
otherwise have. This conclusion is supported by the committee's
rejection of both the compliance provision and the stronger terms
"prescribe" and "order". Under a liberal interpretation, article 41
could be viewed as a mere restatement of the supposed inherent powers
of arbitral tribunals. It then would not be a difficult step to conclude
that interim measures were binding. From the absence of a provision
directing compliance with a judgment, the fact that some members of
the advisory committee were ostensibly of the opinion that article 41
could be used as a basis for a binding order, and the climate attending
the formulation of the Statute and Rules; it is clear that there was no
certain understanding at the time of the Court's formation concerning
the binding nature of the interim measure orders which the Statute
empowered the Court to make.
The practice of the Court to date indicates that it has favored a
liberal interpretation of the language of article 41. For example, the
Court at an early date held that it was empowered to render declaratory
judgments, although there is no express provision in the Statute to that
effect. Likewise, the Court's interpretation of its jurisdiction on a
forum prorogatum theory supports this conclusion. 37 In connection
with interim measures, it is significant that although rule 57 was
repealed, 3 8 the Court nevertheless took note of the failure of Iceland to
observe the measures in the FisheriesJurisdictionCases. 39 Moreover,
even though the Statute does not expressly provide that a party may
request interim measures, the Court has so provided under its general
rule making power. This list of examples, which could be extended
considerably, demonstrates that the Court has not been led by the
Statute into a strict constructionist stance for interpreting the binding
effect of interim measures.
37. On forum prorogatum, see Minority Schools in Upper Silesia, [1928] P.C.I.J.,
ser. A, No. 15; Corfu Channel Case, (Preliminary Objection), [1948] I.C.J. 15. See
generally 2 S. ROSENNE, THE LAW AND PRACTICE OF THE INTERNATIONAL COURT 344-63

(1965).
38. Under the original rules of 1922, rule 57 directed that a refusal to conform to an
indication was to be made a matter of record. That directive was repealed in 1931, as a
part of an extensive reexamination and amendment of the rules. For the text of the rules
and explanatory comments, see I M. HUDSON, WORLD COURT REPORTS 77, 89 (1934).

39. United Kingdom v. Iceland, [1974] I.C.J. 3, 17; Federal Republic of Germany
v. Iceland, [1974] I.C.J. 175, 188.
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It appears from this brief review that the use of certain words and
the absence of a compliance provision, although perhaps presenting
ambiguities, do not and should not preclude an interpretation that
interim measures are binding in international law.
III.

JURISDICTION TO INDICATE INTERIM MEASURES
OF PROTECTION

The issue of whether the Court has jurisdiction to indicate interim
measures has been resolved under a rule which confers jurisdiction
even if there exists only the possibility of jurisdiction over the merits.
This rule is explained on the basis that an indication of interim
measures is merely a "judicial suggestion". 4° This meager jurisdictional basis does suggest a corresponding lack of effect in orders
issued pursuant to article 41.
There is a continued strong school of dissent to the majority's
"possibility rule" .41 The dissenting position believes the Court should
satisfy itself that jurisdiction as to the merits is "reasonably probable"
before acting under article 41, either in entertaining requests for, or in
the actual indication of measures. This approach is urged as being
more consistent with the nature of the international adjudication of
disputes. If -jurisdiction is solely derived from the consent of the
parties, and if there is a distinct possibility that the Court will determine at a later phase of a case that jurisdiction as to the merits is
lacking, then, according to this view, vexation will be incurred in the
interim by the party who successfully objects to the Court's jurisdiction. Moreover, the vexation would be irremediable because of the
nonappealability of a Court order. The binding legal force of interim
measures is implicit in this view .42 It is highly doubtful that vexation in
any other but the legal sense has been taken into consideration.
In the United States federal courts, which are empowered to issue
the analogous but prima facie binding preliminary injunction, a rule
similar to that promoted by the dissenting position is applied: the court
must find that jurisdiction over the merits is "probable" before issuing
40. See note 15 supra, and accompanying text.
41. See the Joint Dissenting Opinion in Anglo-Iranian Oil Co. in which Judges
Winiarksi and Badawi Pasha expressed opposition to the "possibility rule". AngloIranian Oil Co., [1951] I.C.J. 89, 96; see also Goldsworthy, supra note 1, at 263.
42. "Measures of this kind in international law are exceptional in character to an
even greater extent than they are in municipal law; they may easily be considered a
scarcely tolerable interference in the affairs of a sovereign State." Id. at 97. The
reasoning was followed by Judge Padilla Nervo in his Dissenting Opinion to the interim
order in Fisheries Jurisdiction, [1972] I.C.J. 12, 21.
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the injunction pendente lite.4 3 If on appeal the higher court finds that
jurisdiction was not probable, the injunction will be set aside and is
void ab initio.4 4 There are, however, exceptions to this rule which
illustrate why a judicial tribunal such as the International Court would
utilize a possibility rule instead. In the United States system, if a
question as to the merits is determined at the preliminary injunction
phase to be grave and difficult, the lower court may legitimately issue
an injunction pendente lite which binds the parties, even where jurisdiction is found on appeal to be lacking. Additionally, the court can
issue ex parte a binding temporary injunction where the threat to the
subject matter of the suit is imminent and substantial, before determining a doubtful question of jurisdiction. 45
Certain of the same considerations which demand these exceptions weigh heavily on the International Court when it is faced with a
request under article 41. Under the Rules, a request for interim measures is regarded as a matter of urgency. If the Court were required to
determine whether its jurisdiction on the merits were probable, experience has shown that such a question could take months to decide.
Further, when a jurisdictional question is raised in the Court, it will be
regarded as a "grave and difficult" question. Actually, all jurisdictional questions which have been raised could be so classified. This
treatment results from the Rules of the Court and from a self-imposed
limitation dating from the early years of the Permanent Court. If it is at
all feasible, the Court shall not prejudge in any preliminary phase the
merits of the dispute in any way.46 If the possibility of prejudgment
should exist, the jurisdictional question shall be joined to the merits .
This reveals a striking difference between the respective procedures in the United States federal courts and the International Court. In
the former, there is no hesitancy to delve into the merits at the
preliminary injunction phase, absent the exceptional circumstances
discussed above. The danger of prejudging the merits, or of inappropriately restraining a party is obviated by the provisions for an appeal
and a review of any decision on the merits. If the International Court
43. See, e.g., A. H. Bull Steamship Co. v. Nat'l Marine Eng'r Beneficial Ass'n, 250
F.2d 332 (2d Cir. 1957). See also the views expressed by Harlan, J., in his dissenting
opinion in United States v. First Nat'! City Bank, 379 U.S. 385, 390 (1965), and
authorities cited therein.
44. Id.; cf. United States v. Shipp, 203 U.S. 563, 573 (1906); United States v.
UMW, 330 U.S. 258, 292 (1946).
45. See, e.g., American Federation of Musicians v. Stein, 213 F.2d 679 (6th Cir.
1954); Carter v. United States, 135 F.2d 858 (5th Cir. 1943).
46. See German Interests in Polish Upper Silesia, [1925] P.C.I.J., ser. A, No. 6.
47. See, e.g., The Losinger & Co. Case, [1936] P.C.I.J., ser. A/B, No. 67, at 15.
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were obliged to find that its jurisdiction as to the merits was reasonably
probable, the danger of encroaching on the merits could become so
pronounced that the Court would be faced with the dilemma of either
considering the merits or delaying a request for interim measures until
a later phase of the case such as the preliminary objection stage. The
Court has always been a paragon of circumspectness with respect to
jurisdictional and other procedural questions. It is highly unlikely that
it would depart from that standard by addressing itself prematurely to
the merits. However, if relief were postponed, the very purpose of
interim relief would be rendered meaningless because the Court might
find that there were no longer any rights to protect.
Even though at first blush the minimal jurisdiction requirements
suggest that little legal effect should be accorded interim measures of
protection, it would appear that the "possibility rule" has not been
formulated because of an attitude toward the effect of interim measures. Rather, such a rule is necessitated by specific procedural rules
and attitudes relating to the functioning of a court in the unique
48
position of the International Court of Justice.
IV.

THE CASES: ATTITUDES OF THE COURT

Although article 5949 of the Statute of the Court may be interpreted as preventing the operation of the rule of stare decisis, the Court
48. The preceding discussion is a practical justification for the use of the "possibility rule". The legal basis, however, for the rule is discussed by the Court in the interim
measures phase of the case of Interhandel, [1957] I.C.J. 105. The interim measures phase
is viewed by the Court as being distinct from later phases of the case. This may well
follow from the Statute which places article 41 in the chapter entitled "Procedure".
Thus, the Court need not be convinced of its jurisdiction over the merits to order interim
relief. Judge Fitzmaurice was of the opinion that the power to indicate interim measures
was an inherent power, and fell within the "incidental" jurisdiction of the Court along
with other powers which were essential to the Court's functioning as a court. See
Northern Cameroons Case, (Separate Opinion), [1963] I.C.J. 97.
One must question, however, whether the adoption of the "possibility rule" tends
to show that the power to indicate interim relief is not an inherent power. In the first
place, the inclusion of an express provision does not necessarily call for such a conclusion. For example, article 36(6) of the Statute provides that the Court may determine its
own jurisdiction. Nevertheless, this competence de la competence is clearly an inherent
power. In the second place, although the Court has not adopted a possibility test as to the
exercise of any of its other inherent powers, it appears that the interim measures phase is
sui generis. For example, it would be inappropriate to apply such a test to the power of
determining the Court's jurisdiction, and equally inappropriate to apply it to the inherent
power to issue a judgment.
49. Article 59 reads: "The decision of the Court has no binding force except
between the parties and in respect of that particular case." Article 38(l)(d) provides that
the Court in deciding disputes, shall apply judicial decisions with the admonition that
such application is subject to article 59.
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nevertheless has frequently cited the reasoning and holdings of previous cases to support or distinguish its decisions, and has found it
necessary to reconcile what appear to be conflicting decisions. The
Court clearly has attempted to render consistent decisions.
This section will review the interim measures cases in order to
ascertain whether a discernible attitude has existed in the Court with
regard to the binding effect of interim measures. The issue has never
been expressly decided. However, if the cases clearly show that the
measures are not intended to be binding, it is unlikely that the Court
will depart from that stance when, if ever, it finds it necessary to
determine the question directly.
A.

The Permanent Court of InternationalJustice

In the Permanent Court of International Justice, there was a
marked hesitancy to indicate interim measures. If measures were not
clearly binding, it is difficult to understand the reluctance to indicate
them. On the other hand, if the measures imparted some obligation of
compliance, legal or otherwise, then perhaps the hesitancy may be
explained.
The cases where requests for interim measures have been denied
may be divided into two broad categories. The first group is comprised
of those cases in which the "circumstances" did not require an
indication. The second group includes those cases where the request
was not directed to preserving rights which may have been subsequently adjudged as belonging to a party, that is, requests having a
purpose considered to be illegitimate.
As to the first group, the Permanent Court in the first case where
ariicle 41 was applied-' laid down the rule that circumstances are to be
judged by legal criteria. 51 This does not mean that the Court may not
take into consideration a wide variety of factors in determining
whether the circumstances are appropriate. What the rule does imply is
that not all of the circumstances surrounding a case are necessarily
considered relevant. To be sure, what is and is not relevant is difficult
to delimit; circumstances obviously vary from case to case. However,
it is still possible to generalize "relevance" to a certain degree,
particularly in regard to the circumstance of whether the parties were
previously bound to maintain the status quo.
50. Denunciation of the Treaty of 1865 between China and Belgium, [1927]
P.C.I.J., ser. A., No. 8, at.6.
51. Id. at 11.
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If the court order imposes an obligation upon the parties, the
central question is whether the obligation is a legal one in the sense that
a failure to comply would subject the recalcitrant party to damages at
law. If the obligation is only a moral one and if the parties were already
morally bound to maintain the status quo, then there would be no
reason to issue an article 41 order. A fortiori, if the parties were legally
bound, there would be no necessity of ordering interim relief, regardless of its binding nature.5 2
Thus, if the Court indicated interim measures in a situation
otherwise involving only a moral obligation, such a response would be
strongly supportive of classifying the effect of interim measures as
legally binding. On the other hand, if the Court denied a request where
the parties were only morally bound, the value of such a case to the
topic under investigation is questionable. Such a case could indicate
that the requested measures would impose no higher obligation on the
parties. However, it could as easily show that the circumstances were
legally sufficient to remove any necessity of indicating interim measures.
In the case of the Denunciationof the Treaty of 1865, 53 involving
a dispute between Belgium and China over the latter's unilateral
abrogation of treaty obligations, the Court originally indicated interim
measures at the request of the Belgian government. There was no
evidence that the parties were under any obligation relating to protection of the subject matter. Subsequently, the Court revoked its order
following the conclusion of an interim agreement between the parties.
The agreement provided expressly for the protection that the Court had
ordered to obtain. This circumstance was held to remove the necessity
for the interim measures.
Since the parties became legally bound to maintain the status quo,
there was arguably no necessity for the imposition or continuation of
any court ordered obligation regardless of its character. Nevertheless,
the Court's original and subsequent orders contain some intriguing
material relating to the effect of the measures.
The rights that the Belgian government was seeking to protect
were, according to the Court, such that an infraction of those rights
could not be made good simply by the payment of an indemnity or by compensation or restitution in some other material
form . . . . [T]his being so, the object of the measures of
52. For discussion of whether under customary law the parties are bound to
maintain the status quo pendente lite, see notes 25-27, 30 supra, and accompanying text.
53. [1927] P.C.I.J., ser. A., No. 8, at 6.
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interim protection to be indicated in the present case must be
54
to prevent any rights of this nature from being prejudiced.
This excerpt may be interpreted as indicating the Court's intent to
afford Belgium a remedy which would impart legal consequences at
least as cogent as a final judgment providing for the payment of an
indemnity, compensation or restitution if Belgium's rights were infringed. The Court, immediately prior to the above quoted passage,
recited the fact that the parties were subject to the optional clause,
whereby the Court had compulsory jurisdiction over disputes relating
to the nature and extent of reparation to be made for a breach of an
international obligation. 55 However, because of the nature of the rights
that were being adjudicated, a remedy other than reparations was
necessary which could have imparted legal consequences different
from those in a final judgment.
In its order revoking the measures, 56 the Court noted that the
original order had been based upon the alleged rights given by the
denounced treaty; because the parties had agreed to replace that treaty
with an interim regime, the treaty could not
serve as a basis for any claim enforceable at law and put
forward on the ground of some violation of these rights
during the period for which the new regime agreed upon
57
between the parties might be applicable.
At first glance, one may conclude that the Court was only addressing itself to the question of damages for breach of a treaty
obligation, rather than the failure to comply with the interim measures.
Obviously, Belgium could have demanded damages for such a breach.
However, there was no submission at all relating to damages in the
Belgian application, 58 and it is doubtful that the Court would comment
upon an issue that had not been raised by the parties.
In sum, the case would seem to stand for the proposition that the
Court was affording to the applicant a remedy cognizable by the Court
and enforceable under the jurisdiction of the Court. By juxtaposing the
Court's jurisdiction under the optional clause against the effects of a
contingent violation of the rights, it may be asserted that the Court, by
indicating interim measures, would continue its protective jurisdiction
and would allow a remedy for any violation of these rights, even if
such a remedy differed from those recognized under article 36(2).
54.
55.
56.
57.
58.

Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.

at 7.
at 9.
at 10.
at 4.
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The Court also noted that
measures of protection, indicated by the Court as being for
purely legal reasons rendered necessary by circumstances,
cannot be dependent, as regards their applicability, upon the
position of negotiations that may be in progress between the
Parties.5 9
Thus, the order could only be revoked finally and in its entirety. The
meaning of the quoted passage is unclear. It could mean that moral
considerations were irrelevant. On the other hand, in view of later
developments, the better view is that the "legal reasons" relate to the
purpose of interim relief. The reason the Court exercises its power
under article 41 is -to preserve and protect alleged rights; whether such
rights need protection is a matter which the Court, and only the Court,
may determine.
In the case of the Legal Status of the Southeastern Territory of
Greenland,6' Norway's application for interim measures of protection
was denied, and the Court refused to act ex propiromotu. The request
was made to prevent Denmark from taking any measures of violence
against Norwegian nationals in the territory, sovereignty to which was
at issue in the underlying case. The Court noted first that the sovereign
rights for which Norway was contending could not be affected
adversely by the acts which Norway sought to prevent.
The Court next turned to the question of whether these acts could
be the object of an interim protection order on the basis that one of the
purposes of article 41 was to prevent regrettable incidents. The Court
found that the circumstances were such that it was doubtful whether
the acts would occur. Among the circumstances considered relevant
were certain unilateral declarations made on behalf of each of the
parties.
[T]hese declarations, taken together, are indicative of the
existence in responsible circles in both countries of a state of
mind and of intentions which are eminently reassuring ...
[T]hese intentions having been officially proclaimed before
the Court, the latter must not and cannot presume that the
59. Id. at 11.
60. [1932] P.C.I.J., ser. A/B, No. 48, at 243. In this case, the Court admitted judges
ad hoc to sit in the interim measures phase. If judges ad hoc were habitually admitted,
this conceivably would have a bearing on the Court's attitude as to the effect of interim
measures. In other words, if the measures are not binding, there would be little reason to
admit judges ad hoc. However, the urgency factor, which will be of varying import in
each case, would seem to deemphasize the relevance of the admission of or refusal to
admit judges ad hoc to the question of effect. Cf. Hambro, supra note 17, at 162.
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two Governments concerned might act otherwise than in
61
conformity with the intentions thus expressed ....
Although the matter is not entirely free of doubt, it would appear that
no legally binding relationship had arisen to prevent the parties from
engaging in the acts in question. If the Court had simply denied the
Norwegian request, this case would present an argument in favor of a
finding that interim measures are not binding in law. However, the
Court went on to note that the circumstances also included the General
Act for Conciliation, Judicial Settlement and Arbitration which was in
force between the parties and had as its object the prevention of
extending or aggravating the dispute, the same object as the Norwe62
gian request.
In deciding not to act ex propiro motu, the Court considered as
relevant the above-mentioned unilateral declarations, as well as the
fact that any acts which were designed to change the legal status of the
territory would not be irreparable. The inference is that if such acts
were irreparable, interim measures would have been issued to insure
an appropriate remedy at law in the same vein as the case of the
Denunciationof the Treaty of 1865. This view finds further support in
the relevance, which the Court attached to the circumstance that the
parties were both bound by the General Act for Conciliation, Judicial
Settlement and Arbitration, under which the parties agreed to abstain
from measures likely to aggravate or extend a dispute pendente lite.
Under this treaty, the parties could seek, and the Court was conferred
jurisdiction to enforce, an adequate remedy at law for acts or threats of
the sort at issue in the matter.
Once again, it seems reasonable to draw the inference that the
Court was equating the effect of an indication of interim measures with
the stated effect of the compromisory clause of the General Act; that
is, either would afford the parties a legal remedy under the continuing
jurisdiction of the Court.
In the case of the Administration of the Prince von Pless, 63
Germany brought suit against Poland for alleged violation of certain
treaty obligations respecting Upper Silesia. The German government
subsequently requested an indication of interim measures to cause
Poland to abstain from executing certain constraints against the Prince
of Pless for nonpayment of income taxes. The Court later was
informed that Poland had "annulled" the warrant of execution against
61. Id. at 286-87.
62. Id. at 287.
63. [1933] P.C.I.J., ser. A/B, No. 54.
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the subject property. Additionally, the Court noted that Poland had
declared that there would be no attempt to collect the taxes until the
final judgment was rendered, and that Germany had declared that it
was in agreement with the course adopted by Poland. Because of these
circumstances, the Court ruled that the request for interim measures
had "ceased to have any object."'

If the Polish government had persisted in its efforts to collect the
taxes, the circumstances would have been appropriate for the indication of measures. The Polish declaration standing alone did not create
an obligation flowing to Germany. However, by agreeing to this
course of action, which was tantamount to withdrawing its request,
Germany may be said, under principles of estoppel, to have entered
into a legal relationship with Poland. If Poland had proceeded with
collection after Germany's reliance, Poland could have been regarded
as being in breach of an international legal duty owed to Germany.
The Court in its decision did not show the same concern for the
existence or absence of legal remedies available under the jurisdiction
of the Court as it had in the two previous cases. There were intimations
in the opinion that the Court was not acting upon the German request at
all, but rather upon the finding that the German request, for all
practical purposes, had been withdrawn.
Finally, in the case of the Electricity Company of Sofia and
Bulgaria,65 the Court indicated interim measures at the request of the
Belgian government directed against the respondent, Bulgaria. There
was nothing in the opinion of the Court showing that the parties were
bound to maintain the status quo either morally or by express agreement. Neither was there any intimation that the Court was affording a
remedy at law where none existed previously. Rather, the Court for the
first time noted that article 41(1)
applies the principle universally accepted by international
tribunals and likewise laid down in many conventions to
which Bulgaria has been a party-to the effect that the
parties to a case must abstain from any measure capable of
exercising a prejudicial effect in regard to the execution of
the decision to be given and, in general, not allow any step of
any kind to be taken which might aggravate or extend the
dispute .'
64.
65.
66.

Id. at 154.
[19391 P.C.I.J., ser. A/B, No. 79, at 194.
Id. at 199.
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This interpretation of article 41(1) is perhaps the most direct statement concerning the obligatory effect of interim measures; the parties
are required by a general principle of law to maintain the status quo
pendente lite. Even in light of this clear expression, the question of
whether the Court's indication is superfluous remains to be considered.
The quoted passage does indeed go far in supporting the view that
article 41 is itself superfluous and that the Court would be able to
indicate interim relief in its absence with all of the effects recognized
under international law in general.
It is somewhat curious that the Court did not deny interim measures in this case since it recognized a general duty under article 41, and
since Bulgaria, because of its past committments, would clearly be
bound whether the duty were one imposed by "general principles of
law recognized by civilized nations" or customary international law.
As stated above, if the parties were legally bound to observe the
purposes of article 41 relief, there would appear to be no necessity in
indicating interim measures. The action of the Court, then, suggests
that a crucial circumstance would be the existence of an express
agreement between parties, which would bind the party against whom
measures are directed. Additionally, the inference may be drawn that
acts mandated by the obligations of the parties in respect to the
maintenance of the status quo must be supervisable by the Court. Such
would not necessarily be the case if the party were only bound under
general principles of law. In other words, one may conclude from this
case, as well as the Sino-Belgium and Greenlandcases, that the Court
views the effect of interim measures differently than it does those
following from the general duty. 67
Nothing in these Permanent Court cases poses a serious obstacle
to the position according binding legal effect to interim measures.
Rather, some of the cases raise the inference that indication of interim
measures is intended to afford a legal remedy under the jurisdiction of
the Court, or at least to create generally an obligation carrying legal
consequences for failure to comply. On the other hand, the lack of
clarity in the cases would not preclude a finding that only a moral
obligation is imposed. Perhaps the most that can be concluded with
any certainty is that the reluctance of the Permanent Court to act was
indicative that some type of obligation was intended.
B.

The InternationalCourt of Justice

The International Court appears to have departed from the Permanent Court's reluctance to indicate interim measures. However, the
67. See The Losinger & Co. Case, [1936] P.C.I.J., ser. A/B, No. 67.
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four cases in which measures were indicated have been marked by the
nonparticipation of the respondent in the proceedings, except for terse
communiques in some instances. In spite of this deficiency, the Court
did examine various issues as thoroughly as possible expropiro motu.
In the Anglo-Iranian Oil Co. case, 68 the Court, at the request of
the United Kingdom, awarded interim measures relating to the proposed Iranian expropriation of the assets of the company. The parties
were under no type of express obligation to maintain the status quo,
and there is no suggestion in the opinion of the Court that a legal
remedy was being afforded to the United Kingdom.
However, the Court did order very specific measures to obtain,
including one calling for the establishment of a board to see that the
measures were carried out. The Court inplied that such an order was ex
69
abundante cautela in that the measures "retain their own authority."
The implication is that the other measures carried with them a legally
cognizable obligation of compliance. Because the Court found that it
lacked jurisdiction over the merits, these measures lapsed.
In the Interhandel case,70 the applicant, Switzerland, requested
an interim measure which would prohibit the respondent, the United
States, from taking any action which would change the ownership of
shares of the Interhandel Company. Such a measure, if granted, would
go directly to the underlying issue on the merits of the case. The
ownership of the shares was at the time the subject of litigation, to
which the United States was a party in the United States courts. In
denying the request, the Court concluded that the
sale of those shares can only be effected after termination of
a judicial proceeding . . . of which there is no indication as
to its speedy conclusion. . . .[The] sale is therefore condi-

tional upon a judicial decision rejecting the claims of Interhandel. 7 '
The Swiss request was apparently premised on the assumption
that the sale of the shares was imminent. However, the Court relied on
a statement of the United States government to the effect that sale of
the shares was not presently contemplated. In the unlikely event that
these assurances were breached and the shares sold before termination
of the United States action, the status quo would be upset, and the
applicant left virtually remediless. However, the reasoning of the
Court did not shut the door to a future Swiss request, should the
68.
69.
70.
71.

[1951]
Id. at
[1957]
Id. at

I.C.J. 89.
94.
I.C.J. 105.
112.
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situation become precipitous. The Court's reliance on the moral obligation of the United States might imply that the indication of interim
measures would itself impose only a moral obligation on the respondent to preserve the status quo. On the other hand, the Court's apparent
preparedness to reexamine the situation in case the circumstances
should change, suggests that the question of interim measures was not
foreclosed, and that interim measures could be ordered later as a
greater obligation applied to more demanding circumstances. This
view permits the case as a whole to live comfortably with the view that
interim measures are legally binding.
In the FisheriesJurisdictionCase,72 the United Kingdom request
for the indication of interim measures was granted in both general and
specific terms. These terms included the imposition of a maximum on
the catches of British fishing vessels in the disputed area and a
provision that Iceland should not enforce its regulation in regard to the
unilateral extension of the Icelandic fishery zone against British vessels in the area. Similar measures were indicated at the request of West
Germany in the companion case.
At the time the measures were indicated there was no evidence
that Iceland had assumed any express obligation with respect to maintenance of the status quo. Subsequently, negotiations commenced
between the parties with a view to reaching an interim agreement
relating to certain matters in issue. While negotiations were in progress, the United Kingdom in an extraordinary move petitioned the
Court to affirm that the interim measures continued.7 3 The Court, in
complying with the request, noted that its original order of interim
protection did not preclude an interim agreement even though it might
74
differ from the Court order.
The Court stated that the
provisional measures indicated by the Court and confirmed
by the present Order do not exclude an interim arrangement
which may be agreed upon by the Governments concerned,
based on catch-limitation figures different from that indicated as a maximum . . . and on related restrictions con-

cerning areas closed to fishing, number and type of vessels
allowed and form of control of the agreed provisions. ...
[T]he Court, pending the final decision, and in the absence of
72. [1972] I.C.J. 12.
73. United Kingdom v. Iceland, (Continuance of Interim Protection), [1973] I.C.J.
302. A similar action was taken in the German phase. Id. at 313. However, no provisional agreement was concluded between Germany and Iceland.
74. Id. at 303, 313.
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the such interim arrangement, must remain concerned to
preserve, by the indication of provisional measures, the
rights which may subsequently be adjudged by the Court to
belong respectively to the Parties. .... 75

If the parties may depart from the court order, a view to which the
Court apparently subscribed, then the order is not, in a sense, binding
in law. If it were strictly binding, the Court alone would have power to
revoke its own order. In this instance, the Court contemplated an
agreement as a limited exception able to displace the order. This is not
inconsistent with the purpose of interim measures, which is to preserve
the subject matter pendente lite, a goal furthered by an interim agreement the parties might reach concerning the subject matter of the
dispute. The Court did not imply that anything less than an agreement
entailing the duty to comply would suffice. Rather, it stated that absent
the interim agreement, the interim measures would continue.
An interim agreement was in fact reached which provided for a
lower maximum on catches. In its final judgment on the merits, the
Court did not characterize the effect of the interim agreement, or state
whether the agreement had the effect of displacing the conflicting
portion of the order which dealt with catch limitations. The measures
may well have been rendered ineffective by the interim agreement, but
the fact remains that such nullification was never declared even though
the Court had the power to do so. Perhaps the very silence of the Court
on this specific point should be taken as an indication that the measures
lapsed. The Court may well have been concerned with the ruling in
Denunciationof the Treaty of 1865, which held that the Court can only
revoke such an order in its entirety; in FisheriesJurisdiction, only the
portion of the order relating to catches was covered by the parties'
agreement.
It is also reasonable to conclude that the measures did not lapse at
all, at least not until the rendition of the final judgment. There is, for
example, a reference in the final judgment to the fact that Iceland had
failed to comply with the measures, which tends to show that their
operative effect had not lapsed.7 6 Although a somewhat anomalous
75. Id. at 303-04.
76. There is nothing in the Statute or Rules authorizing the Court to take such
notice. Significantly, the remark is found in the opinions in both cases where the Court is
recounting the history of the disputes. Although the United Kingdom had maintained, as
had West Germany, that the acts of the Icelandic patrol boats directed against her
vessels was illegal, such submission was withdrawn. Certainly in United Kingdom v.
Iceland, there was no necessity in recounting Iceland's recalcitrance toward the protective orders for purposes of the judgment. Because there was no necessity, it is doubtful
that the Court would make such a remark unless it viewed the measures as binding as a
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situation would exist where inconsistent obligations are working upon
the parties, the Court's concern with its jurisdiction to oversee the
preservation of the status quo could explain its silence.
As to the issue of bindingness per se, the following passage from
the final judgment strongly implies that the Court views interim measures as requiring a legal obligation of compliance:
An analysis of the [parties'] agreement, in the light of its
object and purpose, reveals that it comprised two sets of
obligations:
(a) those obligations of a transitory character.

. .

by which

the fishing vessels of the other contracting party were allowed to fish for a transitional period within areas of the
outer 6 miles of the 12-mile fishery zone. Those provisions
clearly have attained their objective and may be considered
to have expired... ;
(b) other obligations . . . which do not have a transitional
character since for them. . . the parties did not provide any

limitation ratione temporis.
It is possible that today Iceland may find that some of
the motives which induced it to enter into the 1961 Exchange
of Notes have become less compelling or have disappeared
altogether. But this is not a ground justifying the repudiation
of those parts of the agreement the object and purpose of
which have remained unchanged. Iceland has derived benefits from the executed provisions of the agreement ...
Clearly it then becomes incumbent on Iceland to comply
with its side of the bargain. .

.

. Moreover, in the case of a

treaty which is in part executed and in part executory, in
which one of the parties has already benefited from the
executed provisions of the treaty, it would be particularly
inadmissible to allow that party to put an end to obligations
which were accepted under the treaty by way of quid pro
quo for the provisions which the other party has already
executed. 77
The question of the exact legal effect of the Court's order remains. It may be that as long as the indication of interim measures is
outstanding, the Court has jurisdiction to decide disputes relating to
violation of the measures. On the other hand, it may well be that an
independent basis of jurisdiction may be required, a violation of
matter of law. The Court in exercising its functions, is not concerned with the morality or
political behavior of the parties.
77. [1973] I.C.J. 4, 62.
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interim measures being shown to support an independent claim for
reparation for an unlawful act.
In the companion case, Federal Republic of Germany v. Iceland,78 the situation of the parties was virtually the same except in two
important instances. First, no interim agreement between the parties
was reached, and second, Germany submitted that Iceland should be
held in principle to be under an obligation to compensate Germany for
interference with its fishing vessels in the disputed areas of Iceland's
fishery zone. Germany contended as the basis of this submission that
certain acts of harrassment by Icelandic coastal patrol boats were
unlawful under international law. However, those acts were also clear
violations of interim measures previously indicated.
The Court, with surprising ease, noted first that it had jurisdiction
to deal with the submission as it was a dispute relating to Iceland's
extension of its fisheries jurisdiction, 79 and thus fell within the compromissory clause of an Exchange of Notes between the parties, upon
which the Court's main jurisdiction had been held to obtain. The
compromissory clause simply provided that any dispute relating to the
extension of the fishery zone could be referred to the International
Court of Justice at the request of either party.
As discussed above, the-Court's jurisdiction to indicate interim
relief and the Court's jurisdiction to decide the underlying dispute are
founded upon different bases. If the Court finds that the former
jurisdiction obtains, and if interim measures are legally binding, would
it not follow that the Court could then entertain a claim for reparations
for violation of the measures without the necessity of an independent
basis of jurisdiction? Several of the previously discussed cases support
the hypothesis that the Court had this in mind when measures were
indicated. The question arises whether the Court's statements in connection with the West German -submission destroy this hypothesis
since the Court held that its jurisdiction for claims relating to acts
clearly in violation of the protective order was founded upon the
Exchange of Notes.
One need not assume that the basis of relief which West Germany
submitted was solely the indication of the relevant measure. Rather,
the basis was, albeit vaguely, "international law". Besides the Court's
protective order, the general duty to maintain the status quo pendente
lite under rules of international law may have been utilized to show the
unlawfulness of the act. Moreover, the Court's conclusion that its
78. [1974] I.C.J. 175.
79. Id. at 203.
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jurisdiction was based on the fact that the submission fell within the
compromissory clause, did not preclude independent jurisdiction based
on the Court's protective order. Since the German submission was
abstract, it would have been untoward for the Court to have stated
expressly that its jurisdiction obtained on that basis. However, considering the relative ease with which the Court did find jurisdiction,
this may well have been in mind.
Finally, it should be noted that the Court did not make any
statement relating to the basis of relief. Judge de Castro was of the
opinion that the unlawfulness of Iceland's acts could have been based
either on the fact that they occurred pendente lite or on the basis of the
Court's protective order.80 In other words, a violation of an interim
measure would carry with it the responsibility of reparation. However,
in his view, an independent basis of jurisdiction must clearly be
shown, and the compromissory clause of the Exchange of Notes was
too remote to establish such jurisdiction.
One may not quarrel with his finding that Iceland's acts upset the
status quo. Such acts may well be quite remote from the underlying
dispute, and as a matter of fairness, it does not seem unreasonable to
require an independent basis of jurisdiction. However, where the Court
has previously indicated interim relief, it is difficult to understand how
these acts could be considered remote to the underlying dispute over
which the Court has jurisdiction. Where parties have referred a dispute
to the Court by consenting to its jurisdiction, the parties must be
deemed aware of the possibility of related indications of interim
measures. On the other hand, where one party merely alleges that
certain acts were unlawful simply because they took place pendente
lite, the principle that the Court only has jurisdiction if the parties
consent thereto looms large.
Neither FisheriesJurisdiction case appears to present any obstacle to concluding that there is a legal duty of compliance. Rather,
United Kingdom v. Iceland strongly supports the position that interim
measures may be viewed as substitutes for express agreements to
maintain the status quo. The Court.did not say that an agreement would
have changed the circumstances so that the interim measures would not
be appropriate, but even if this is the correct interpretation, the Court
certainly did not indicate that a unilateral assertion would be sufficient
to alter-the circumstances.
80. See Federal Republic of Germany v. Iceland, (Separate Opinion), [1974] I.C.J.
225, 226.
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The other broad category of cases in which requests for interim
measures were denied were those in which the purpose of the request
was found to be incompatible with article 41. These cases likewise
pose no obstacle to a finding of a legal duty of compliance.
In the Case Concerning the Factory at Chorzow," l Germany's
request for interim measures was denied because the request was found
to be for an illegitimate purpose, that is, the award of an interim
judgment.
The only other case falling clearly within this category provides
an even better example of how the Court has dealt with this problem.
In the case of the Polish Agrarian Reform and the German Minority,82
the Court stated:
[T]he essential condition which must necessarily be fulfilled
in order to justify a request for the indication of interim
measures should have the effect of protecting the rights
forming the subject of the dispute submitted to the Court
83

Germany contended that Poland was in breach of a certain treaty
obligation by having applied its agrarian reform to persons of the
German minority. On the other hand, the requested interim measures
were aimed at securing a general suspension of the reform in futuro
with respect to all members of the German minority. Thus, the Court
concluded the measures were not designed solely to protect the rights
which were the subject matter of the underlying action.
It can be inferred from the Court's opinion that the measures
would have had not only some effect, but a substantial legal effect.
The Court understood that the "interim measures asked for would
result in a general suspension of the agrarian reform.' ' If the only
effect envisioned were a moral one, the choice of "may" or "might"
would seem to have been more appropriate.
This case best illustrates the most probable reason for the reluctance of the Court to indicate measures; since the measures impart
legal consequences, the Court must be cautious before enforcing its
power.
V.

INTERIM MEASURES AS STATEMENTS OF GENERAL DUTY

In the case of Electricity Company of Sofia and Bulgaria, 85 the
Permanent Court noted that article 41 was an application of a general
81.
82.
83.
84.
85.

[1927]
[1933]
Id. at
Id. at
[1939]

P.C.I.J., ser. A, No. 12, at 9.
P.C.I.J., ser. A/B, No. 58, at 175.
177.
178 (emphasis added).
P.C.I.J., ser. A/B, No. 79.
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principle of law to the effect that parties to a dispute are bound to
maintain the status quo pendente lite. Since the parties are already
under a duty imposed by international law to preserve the status quo, it
would not seem unreasonable to conclude that interim measures are
superfluous 86
Another view which attempts to reconcile this principle with
interim measures holds that the order of the Court is not legally
binding, but imposes a moral obligation upon the parties to comply
because the status of the Court demands at least some degree of
respect.87 Under this view, the order is characterized as a special -type
of advisory opinion; the Court advises the parties of what may be
required to fulfill the duty imposed by international law, but such
advisory statements are not binding, unlike the general duty to main88
tain the status quo. Since interim measures are not legally binding
according to this position, one must conclude that the measures cannot
even raise a presumption that a general duty demands exactly what the
Court orders. For if a presumption were created by virtue of the order,
then this would clearly accord legal effect to interim measures. Alternatively, if the order does not even raise a presumption, the advisory
opinion label must be one devoid of substance.
In characterizing the order as an advisory opinion, certain logical
difficulties arise regarding orders and portions of orders framed only in
general terms. Such orders would contribute no content to the general
duty which they purport to specify. A case might arise where the
applicant is contending in the alternative that damages are forthcoming
on the basis of either the general duty or the Court's order. If the order
is not binding, the Court's decision could well be to the effect that the
respondent was not bound "to preserve and protect the subject matter," but is nevertheless liable in damages because by doing a certain
act, the general duty to preserve the status quo had been violated. The
incongruity of this position would be brought into even sharper focus if
a state specifically pleaded the Court's order as its sole basis for relief.
If the Court were to specify what the parties should or should not
do, this special form of an advisory opinion would give specific
content to what, in the Court's opinion, was mandated by the "general
duty". Yet here the result of the above hypothetical case could prove
to be even more curious and embarrassing. The Court may be compelled to hold in a declaratory judgment that the recalcitrant party was
86. See text accompanying notes 65-67, supra; cf. CHENG, supra note 15, at 14041,273.
87. DUMBAULD, supra note 4, at 169.
88. See generally DUMBAULD, supra note 4.
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not "legally bound", for example, to limit its fish catches to a specific
tonnage; yet because that party failed to do so, the other party is
entitled to damages because the general principle requiring maintenance of the status quo was violated. Again if the order alone were
urged as the basis of relief, the applicant would lose. Under this view,
the state against whom interim measures were directed could not rely
on those measures as a statement of its duty, and yet it would act at its
peril if it were not to so rely.
For this reason, it is doubtful that the Court would attribute the
characteristics of an advisory opinion to its order. 89 The alternatives
therefore are reduced to finding that the order is either a nullity or it
imposes a legal or moral obligation. If the order is viewed as binding in
law, one is still confronted with an overlapping "general duty". It
would appear, however, that a reconciliation can be deduced quite
easily. It is not unusual for a party to be legally required to do a certain
act where the basis of the duty emanates from two independent
sources. In addition, the Court could attribute effects to its orders
which differ from those attributed to the general principle.
Electricity Company of Sophia and Bulgaria,' supports this
proposition. The Court in that case recognized that the parties were
under a duty to maintain the status quo, yet the Court indicated interim
measures. The inference is that the effects were considered to be
different. As discussed above, the order may establish continuing
jurisdiction, relieving the applicant from the burden of showing some
independent basis of jurisdiction, a burden which would have to be met
if the applicant only contended that a general principle of law had been
violated. Even if an independent basis of jurisdiction were held to be
required, the applicant's burden would be lighter where the basis of
relief was the violation of the order.
VI.

DEGREE OF FINALITY

Even though interim measures may not entail a duty of compliance, the parties may stipulate through an agreement that measures
are binding upon them.
Under article 94(1) of the Charter of the United Nations, states are
understood to agree to comply with "the decision" of the Court in
cases to which they are parties. Additionally, any failure to comply
with a "judgment" may lead to sanctions imposed by the Security
Council.91
89. See section VIII, infra.
90. [1939] P.C.I.J., ser. A/B, No. 79.
91. Article 94 reads:
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By virtue of the failure of the respondent, Iran, to observe the
specific measures indicated in Anglo-Iranian Oil Company, the applicant, United Kingdom, sought Security Council action under article
94. Although the Security Council did not act, no decision was made
indicating the Council's position on whether interim measures fall
within the purview of article 94. Security Council treatment of the
matter was inconclusive, and as such, the case stands alone. 92
It is likely that a decision of the Security Council not to act under
article 94 would be motivated more by political than legal considerations, and its decisions would not be binding upon the Court in
determining the legal effect of interim measures generally, although
such a decision might have an impact upon an advisory opinion of the
Court as to whether interim measures fall within article 94. If interim
measures do fall within article 94, then they must be attributed a
substantial legal effect. However, even if they do not fall within article
94, one may not conclude from that fact alone that a legal duty of
compliance is precluded.
As the Court pointed out in Anglo-Iranian Oil Co., the measures
retain their own authority. 93 This would imply that interim measures
have some effect regardless of their enforceability under article 94. If
interim measures were found not to fall within article 94, a potentially
effective means of enforcement would be lost. However, such a
finding would require a strained interpretation. Although an indication
of interim measures may be a "decision" in a general sense, it is
hardly the "decision of the Court" anticipated in article 94. Likewise,
it is hardly a '.'judgment". Both of these terms are obviously used in
94
reference to the final decision or judgment on the merits.
Under article 59 of the Statute of the Court, "the decision has no
binding force except between the parties to the case." Since the Statute
is an integral part of the Charter, there is no reason to believe that the
terms "judgment" and "decision" have any different meaning there
than they do under article 94. While it is clear that the relevant
provisions of the Statute refer at least to the final decision on the
1. Each Member of the United Nations undertakes to comply with the
decision of the International Court of Justice in any case to which it is a party.
2. If any party to a case fails to perform the obligations incumbent upon it
under a judgment rendered by the Court the other party may have recourse to
the Security Council, which may, if it deems necessary, make recommendations or decide upon measures to be taken to give effect to the judgment.
92. Much has been written about this aspect of the Anglo-Iranian dispute. See, e.g.,
A. FORD, THE ANGLO-IRANIAN OIL DISPUTE OF 1951-1952, 124 et seq. (1954).
93. [1951] I.C.J. 89, 94.
94. Hambro, supra note 17, at 164.
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merits, 95 there is little reason to conclude that article 59 states that only
such decisions have binding force, although it has been so interpreted
by some writers. 96 An interim measure would not have to be interpreted as a decision under article 59 to be binding. It is an order, and
obviously orders may have substantial legal effects, even though they
differ from final decisions. 97 Nevertheless, because interim measures
are issued through orders, the position has been maintained that because of this fact, interim measures are not binding. This view is based
upon a misinterpretation of a passage in an order in the Free Zones
Case ,98 where the Court said:
[O]rders made by the Court, although as a general rule read
in open Court, due notice having been given to the Agents,
have no "binding" force (Article 59 of the Statute) or "final" effect (Article 60 of the Statute) in deciding the dispute
brought by the Parties before the Court. . ...
The Court does indicate in the Free Zones Case opinion that an
order would not be binding upon the parties."t° However, a close
reading of the statement reveals that the Court was merely expressing
the rule that an order has no binding force on the Court in its ultimate
decision on the merits of the dispute. In other words, under article 60
of the Statute, only the judgment on the merits has final effect. It has
been observed that orders indicating interim measures may be modified or revoked, and thereby are not res judicata. However, the
question is whether such an order has binding force on the parties in
the absence of such modification. The binding effect of the interim
order on the parties is entirely independent of the order's effect on the
issuing court. The finding with respect to the binding effect of interim
measures on the parties is simply irrelevant to a determination of the
Court's powers in entertaining a final judgment which follows on the
heels of an interim order. 10 1
95. Article 59 is included in the section of the Statute pertaining to final judgments.
Curiously, the word "judgment" is employed in every article of that section,'except in
article 59.
96. For a discussion of this view, see Goldsworthy, supra note 1, at 274.
97. E.g., orders setting time limits. The subject matter of such orders is clearly
procedural as it relates to the internal functioning of the Court. However, this should not
call for a denigration of orders indicating interim measures when one recalls that article
41 falls under the heading of "Procedure" in the Statute.
98. [1929] P.C.I.J., ser. A, No. 22, at 5.
99. Id. at 13.

100. Id.
101. Other determinants, besides the Charter, of the legal effect of interim measures
would be provisions of bilateral or multilateral conventions. The General Act for the
Pacific Settlement of Disputes, article 33, provides that the parties agree to comply with
interim measures indicated by the Permanent Court. This may be taken as a belief on the
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TERMINATION OF EFFECT

Whatever operative effects interim measures have, an obligation
to comply ends with a finding that the Court has no jurisdiction, or
upon the rendition of the final decision. It is not clear, however,
whether the measures are void ab initio in a case where the Court finds
that it does not have jurisdiction of the merits, and whether, in the case
of rendering a final judgment, the measures could not furnish the Court
jurisdiction in some instances. The effect of "lapse" in both of these
areas is important to the question of whether the Court may entertain a
claim for damages arising from violation of interim measures.
In the Anglo-Iranian Oil Co. 102 case, the Court, on finding
jurisdiction lacking, stated that the interim measures lapsed "upon the
delivery of this Judgment." 0 3 However, it is merely speculative to
part of the parties that no duty of compliance otherwise existed. It may, on the other
hand, merely be an expression of what is implicit in article 41 of the Statute, or an effort
to clear up the ambiguities discussed above, which inhere in the effect of interim
measures. For text of General Act, see 93 L.N.T.S. 345, 357. For other examples, see 6
HACKWORTH DIGEST INT'L L. 117-18 (1943).
In the Nuclear Tests case, involving a dispute between Australia and France over
the latter's detonation of nuclear devices in the South Pacific, Australia requested
interim measures of protection ordering France to desist from such activity. The Australian request was based upon article 41 of the Statute and article 33 of the General Act, to
which both of the disputants were allegedly parties.
Article 33(1) of the General Act provides:
In all cases where a dispute from the object of. . . judicial proceedings, and
particularly if the question on which the parties differ arises out of acts already
committed or on the point of being committed, the Permanent Court of
International Justice, acting in accordance with Article 41 of its Statute, ...
shall lay down within the shortest possible time the provisional measures to be
adopted. The parties to the dispute shall be bound to accept such measures.
Because the General Act was also being urged as a basis for the jurisdiction of the Court
as to the merits, and because France contended it was not bound by the General Act, the
Court determined whether interim measures were appropriate solely from the standpoint
of article 41. The question arises as to whether, if a provision such as article 33(1) were
applicable, the approach of the Court would be different from the situation which exists
when only article 41 is applicable.
This is related to the question whether the effect of interim measures should be
viewed differently in the case where the parties have submitted a dispute to the Court by
special agreement, as opposed to a case where jurisdiction is disputed.
It seems that the Court would not utilize such a distinction as a justification for
attributing different legal effects to interim measures. The Court has made it clear that
the sole criterion for determining its jurisdiction is the consent of the parties thereto. In
other words, there is no difference in theory between the various methods the parties
may choose to place a dispute under the Court's jurisdiction. But cf. 2 O'CONNELL,
INTERNATIONAL LAW 1094 (2d ed. 1970). See Hambro, supra note 17, at 161. Moreover,
even though a dispute is referred to the Court by special agreement, a party is not
precluded from contesting the Court's jurisdiction although such action would be highly
unlikely. Cf. Case of the Monetary Gold Removed from Rome in 1943, [1954] I.C.J. 19.
102. Anglo-Iranian Oil Co. Case, (Preliminary Objection), [1952] I.C.J. 93.
103. Id. at 114.
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assert that this statement was meant as a formal adoption of the
practice, familiar in United States courts, of regarding a preliminary
injunction as remaining operative until the finding on jurisdiction is
made." If measures were to remain operative until the judgment on
jurisdiction or the final judgment is rendered, this might seem to
encourage frivolous claims. The history of the Court indicates that
frivolous claims have not often confronted the Court. In the event
frivolous claims are brought, the Court must determine prior to any
indication of measures that its lack of jurisdiction is not "manifest";
most frivolous claims could be disposed of under that rule.
Finally, it may be posited that parties to the Statute of the Court
have accepted the Court as an arbiter of disputes and have agreed to be
subject to all of its inherent powers and must abide with the exercise of
them until the Court determines through the appropriate processes and
procedures the issues presented to it, whether procedural or substantive. The Court has made clear that its jurisdiction to indicate interim
measures is, for all practical purposes, independent of its jurisdiction
over the merits. Jurisdiction to indicate measures would appear to be
more closely related to the inherent power of an international tribunal
to determine its own jurisdiction than to the doctrine that jurisdiction is
05
conferred through the consent of the parties.'
There is one exceptional case, however, in which interim measures may have no,effect at all and would be void ab initio regardless of
their basis in the inherent power of the Court. Such a case would arise
where the Court determines that it has no jurisdiction because there is
no "dispute". This follows from the language of article 41 and the
qualification that a dispute must exist before measures can be indicated
even under the inherent power of international tribunals. In other
words, if there is no "dispute", there is no "case". Again, in most
instances this issue of whether there is a dispute could be treated and
decided under the Court's "possibility" rule. But even where this is
not feasible, the Court should treat the issue, if it arises, as "prepreliminary" and decide it at least provisionally before ordering interim measures.
In the case where a state X request for measures is granted but
state X loses on the merits of the dispute to state Y, an even stronger
case can be made that state X might still have an action against state Y
on the basis of violation by state Y of the interim measures. In this
hypothetical situation, the Court would have jurisdiction of the under104. See United States v. UMW, 330 U.S. 258,290 (1946). See also Carter v. United
States, 135 F.2d 858, 861 (5th Cir. 1943).
105. See note 48, supra.
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lying dispute. Moreover, the purpose of interim measures is not to
preserve the subject matter in favor of only the winning party, but also
to preserve it in order for the Court to be able to render a final decision.
Thus, the measures protect both the applicant and the respondent. "
106. Assuming that an indication of interim measures imposes a legal obligation of
compliance, the consequences of a failure to comply with the order must be examined.
Doubtlessly, an interim measure could be utilized as a basis for holding that a particular
act in violation of the measure was illegal. For example, in the German phase of Fisheries
Jurisdiction, the illegality of the action of Icelandic patrol boats could be proved by
showing that such acts were in violation of the interim order.
In examining the question, Hambro was of the opinion that when a party fails to
observe the measures, such party would be liable for damages caused by the failure to
comply. Hambro's position appears to be that the other innocent party would be entitled
to damages if an injury could be shown, the burden of proof being on the recalcitrant
party. See Hambro, supra note 17, at 170. The indication of interim measures is clearly
for the benefit of the parties and logically would impose a duty of mutual benefit.
However, a case might arise where an order has been violated without any ascertainable
injury having been suffered by the other party. Since the measures are not only for the
benefit of the parties, but also of the Court, it would appear that some remedial action
could still be taken. In the previous hypothetical situation, there would be no obstacle to
the Court's imposing any of the following forms of punishment: 1) imposition of a fine;
2) reduction of the amount of damages that the winning recalcitrant party is entitled to; 3)
increasing the amount of damages due the innocent winning party. In the case of a
declaratory judgment, the first option could be utilized and the fine awarded to the
innocent party.
Hambro also takes the position that if the winning party, either on the jurisdictional
question or the merits, has complied with the interim measures directed primarily against
such party, then the Court should require the losing but innocent party to compensate the
winning party for any damages that the winning party had suffered by complying with
the measures. Id. at 170-71. This position is somewhat difficult to accept. In the first
place, the measures are for the benefit of the Court and for the benefit of each party
whether it wins or loses. Secondly, it is somewhat novel to suggest that a party be paid
for complying with a duty that the law imposes, and which of necessity will limit the
freedom of action of that party.
Hambro's suggested rule is justified in part on the basis that it will prevent frivolous,
light hearted claims. Id. at 171. If a request were frivolously made, it is submitted that
interim measures never would be indicated, even if the respondent had nothing at all to
do with the proceedings. Moreover, if the claim as to jurisdiction were frivolous, even
the Court's "possibility rule" would preclude the indiciation of interim measures. See
text following note 104, supra.
As to the jurisdictional question, that is, where the Court decides it has no jurisdiction over the merits and has previously directed interim measures against the party
who successfully challenges such jurisdiction, it is incorrect to infer that such party
would have won on the merits. Moreover, the party who wins on the jurisdictional issue
has accepted in some form the Court, as well as the fact that the jurisdiction to indicate
interim measures is distinct in many respects from jurisdiction as to the merits.
To be sure, a hypothetical case could be devised that would support the Hambro
rule of compensation. For example, state A seises the Court of a dispute with state B
which is not a member of the United Nations, not a party to the Statute, and which in no
other way has manifested its consent to the jurisdiction of the Court. If the Court
indicates interim measures and state B complies therewith to its detriment, it would
seem that the only fair result should be to require state A to compensate state B when
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Based upon the above observations, the Court could conclude that
interim measures are legally binding upon the parties. Some of the
barriers to this position could be cleared with ease, others with considerable agility. On the other hand, the Court could find just as easily
and consistently with previous decisions, that measures are not legally
binding.
In view of the previous work of the Court, it is certain that a
legalistic approach will be followed on any issue. This does not mean
that the Court is blind as to extralegal considerations, but such considerations have been recognized by the Court only in legal contexts.
This feature is most clearly evidenced in the Court's advisory function.
In deciding whether it should undertake a function which is clearly
discretionary under the Statute, the Court has been influenced greatly
by its relationship to the United Nations of which it is an integral part.
The declaration of an advisory opinion represents the participation of
the Court in the work of the United Nations as a whole, and a request
"in principle, should not be refused." 0 7 Although there are certain
political overtones to this function of the Court, the Court has made it
clear that its judicial character must always be preserved. 108
One may dismiss immediately the suggestion that the Court
would characterize the indication of interim measures as an advisory
opinion. While the rendering of an advisory opinion does fulfill a valid
purpose in light of the status of the Court in the United Nations, the
issuing of protective measures relates solely to the Court's judicial
the Court decides it has no jurisdiction over the merits. Yet this case will remain
hypothetical. The Court would not indicate interim measures in the first place, for it is
clear that even under the "possibility rule", the Court would hold that it lacked jurisdiction to indicate interim measures. Consider a similar action on the part of the Court,
except that state B is a party to the Statute but has not filed a declaration under article
36(2), nor is there any basis for jurisdiction under article 36(1). It is almost certain that
the Court would not indicate interim measures, even though it may be said that there is
the "possibility" that the Court, under a forum prorogatum theory, may be able to
secure jurisdiction of the underlying dispute. Cf. Treatment in Hungary of Aircraft and
Crew of United States of America (U.S.A. v. U.S.S.R.), [1954] I.C.J. 103. However,
some act of the respondent, which would reasonably justify the possibility of jurisdiction
forum prorogatum may be brought to the attention of the Court. In such a case, if the
Court indicated interim measures, the respondent, on the basis of the previous discussion, would not be entitled to relief where it complies with the jurisdictional issue.
Because of its act, such party should be held to have accepted the possibility that the
Court would indicate interim measures.
107. Interpretation of Peace Treaties, [1950] I.C.J. 65, 71.
108. See, e.g., Judgments of the Administrative Tribunal of the I.L.O., [1956] I.C.J.
77, 84.

https://scholarlycommons.law.cwsl.edu/cwilj/vol7/iss2/3

34

Crockett: The Effects of Interim Measures of Protection in the Internationa
CALIFORNIA WESTERN

INTERNATIONAL LAW JOURNAL

Vol. 7

function. The criteria applied to the granting of an advisory opinion,
which is not binding, would not be applicable to the indication of
interim measures. The Court's status as a coequal organ of the United
Nations necessarily precludes it from assuming a superior role to the
other organs. Although article 41(2) directs the Court to communicate
a notice of the indication of interim measures to the Security Council,
it is clear that the indication in no way binds the Council. Conversely,
because of the equality, a finding by the Security Council that such an
indication did not fall within the ambit of article 94, would have no
effect upon the Court, except perhaps as a matter of fact in rendering
an advisory opinion.
One must not lose sight of the fact that in addition to the Court's
role as a "principal organ" in its own right, it is also the principal
judicial organ of the United Nations. 109 The Court has been as to its
judicial functions extremely cautious and protective. It frequently has
stated the opinion that the Court is a court of law or of justice. What
emerges from this continuing characterization is that the Court will not
imply, as to its judicial function, limitations upon its powers, or
purposely restrict the legal efficacy of its acts unless there is an express
prohibition in the Statute or in the Charter. When considering the
functions of the Court as the principal judicial organ of the United
Nations, the stress must be upon the word "judicial".
This basic factor has also played an important role in several
decisions of the Court. For example, in the Case Concerning the
Northern Cameroons,I" the Court refused to exercise its jurisdiction
because, according to the Court, its judgment on the merits would have
no legal effect. The Court stated:
The function of the Court is to state the law, but it may
pronounce judgment only in connection with concrete cases
where there exists at the time of adjudication an actual
controversy involving a conflict of legal interests between
the parties. The Court's judgment must have some practical
consequence in the sense that it can affect existing legal
rights or obligations of the parties, thus removing uncertainty from their legal relation. No judgment on the merits in
this case could satisfy these essentials of the judicial function."'
In the Case of the Free Zones 112 the Court said:
109.

U.N. CHARTER art. 92.

110. [1963] I.C.J. 15.
111. Id. at 33-34.
112. [1932] P.C.I.J., ser. A/B, No. 46, at 96.
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THE EFFECTS

OF INTERIM MEASURES

After mature consideration, the Court maintains its opinion

that it would be incompatible with the Statute, and with its
position as a Court of Justice, to give a judgment which
would be dependent for its validity on the subsequent ap113
proval of the Parties.

In its advisory opinion in Eastern Carelia, it was observed that the
Court, "being a Court of Justice, cannot, even in giving advisory
opinions, depart from the essential rules guiding their activity as a
Court. -

1 14

The above excerpts from Free Zones and Northern Cameroons
apply specifically to judgments, but the generality and broadness of
these pronouncements could easily be applied to indications of interim
measures.
These considerations regarding the Court's status would weigh
heavily in any determination the Court might make concerning the
legal effect of interim measures. If the language of article 41 can be
overcome, and it appears that it could be, the above declarations
suggest that the Court will not permit its judicial pronouncements to be
void of legal effect. 5 Having acted under article 41, or by virtue of its
inherent powers, the Court, when faced with the characterization of the
legal effect of interim measures, would likely feel compelled to accord
binding legal consequence to its indication.
IX.

CONCLUSION

In the final analysis, the International Court of Justice is itself the
only potential arbiter of the legal effect to be accorded interim meas113. Id. at 161.
114. [1923] P.C.I.J., ser. B, No. 5, at 29.
115. [Ilt would not be in conformity with the' august character of the Court as an
"organ of international law" and as the "principal judicial organ of the United
Nations"... to make any decision that the parties were free to respect or to
ignore according to their own pleasure.
Hambro, supra note 17, at 165-66. It is somewhat remarkable that Hambro alone has
considered this to be a-relevant factor in interpreting the legal effect of interim measures
of protection. This writer's position differs on this point from Hambro only in respect to
the ultimate resolution of the question. In his opinion, "it is not the Court's own
jurisprudence which decides whether the measures impose legally binding obligations on
the parties." Id. at 154-55.
The attempt here has been to suggest objectively the better view as to interpretative
problems, and the weight to be accorded various factors. However, if the International
Court of Justice decided in a case that measures were not binding per se, would not that
decision settle the question, in spite of article 59 of the Statute? To be sure, there is the
possibility that the Court in acting under article 41 or its supposed inherent powers,
purposely may not impose an obligation of compliance. For example, in a number of
interim orders the exhortative word "should" is found instead of "shall" or "must", or
their equivalent. This feature could be utilized by the Court to find the order nonbinding.
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ures. Such a determination could be achieved through an advisory
opinion or contentious case involving either a declaratory judgment or
a claim for damages or restitution.
Considering the attitude of the Court in its previous declarations
in similar cases, it may be concluded that interim measures have some
effect. Although they are not res judicata, they do enrich or diminish a
party's legal position so that a party's affirmative action aimed at relief
and recognized as valid under international law would be justified, or
monetary or restitutionary liability for a violation of an order indicating
interim measures would be entailed. To hold that interim measures
have no legal effect would be tantamount to rendering them nullities.
It is clear that the award of interim measures has no legal effect on
the Security Council of the United Nations and, by the same token, the
practice of the Council under article 94 of the Charter would have no
bearing upon the legal effect of awards issued by the Court.
Although the Court is not a political organ, and although it does
not make political decisions, it cannot be unmindful of the role it plays
in international relations.
The Court will base any decision it makes on law; this has been
expressly recognized in relation to questions raised by interim measures. However, if such measures were declared to be nothing more
than judicial suggestions, the efficacy of utilizing the Court, and the
stature of the Court would be sorely impaired. The Court of course is
concerned with the extent of its influence, for it does and should take
into consideration the international political effect of its legal decisions.
If there were only a minimal legal justification for according
binding legal effect to interim measures, there is no doubt of the
decision which the Court would reach. However, in light of the above
discussion, it appears that there are many factors substantiating the
position that consequential legal effects attend interim measures.
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